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Abstract  
The World Bank’s legal and judicial reforms programs have expanded considerably 
since it began to address the issue of governance in the early 1990s. Initially the Bank 
focused on legal reforms for inducing private investment. Currently, its legal assistance 
extends to include the criminal justice sector. Such activities cannot be directly 
construed from its Articles of Agreement. This paper will discuss how the Bank 
interpreted its Articles in order to ligitimize its expanding activities. The Bank has 
manoeuvred itself into the criminal justice sector by skillfully changing its concept of 
development without deviating from its mandate. The change can be described as an 
‘evolution’ which has allowed the Bank to identify any area as target for its 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The World Bank’s legal and judicial reforms programs have expanded 
considerably since it began to address the issue of governance in the early 1990s. 
Initially the Bank focused primarily on legal reforms for inducing private investment. 
Currently, however, the Bank’s specialized legal assistance extends to include the 
criminal justice sector such as anti-money laundering. In 2005 the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank undertook joint funding to 
set up a regional advisor to assist Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Viet Nam in implementing their respective anti-money laundering (AML) programs and 
frameworks for countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). It is noteworthy that the 
World Bank has entered into a partnership with the UNODC, a UN office which 
provides assistance to police and prosecutor offices in member countries in order to 
fight against illicit drug dealing, international organized crime and terrorism. According 
to a UNODC document, the regional advisor provides advice, training and technical 
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assistance to national authorities to support their efforts in establishing, developing and 
strengthening AML/CFT regulatory and enforcement capacities in the respective 
countries. The agencies targeted for assistance and training include financial intelligence 
units, police forces, customs offices, prosecutors and the judiciary, and key policy 
agencies. “The UNODC/World Bank partnership aims to assist agencies in practical and 
meaningful ways to equip them to deal with a range of money laundering and terrorist 
financing issues, from effective regulation of the financial sector to detection of 
suspected illegal activities and investigation and prosecution of criminal acts, where 
appropriate.”1 Such activities by the World Bank cannot be construed directly from its 
Articles of Agreement which set down the Bank’s purposes, the main one being to help 
finance specific projects for productive purposes. Thus the question is how the Bank, 
under its Articles of Agreement, can justify the extension of its legal assistance to the 
criminal justice sector in a recipient country?  
 In this paper I will discuss how the World Bank has interpreted its Articles of 
Agreement in order to legitimize its expanding activities through an examination of 
documents issued by the Bank and its General Counsel. I will first explain the mandate 
of the Bank as set forth in its Articles and relevant provisions thereto. Secondly, I will 
describe how the Bank formulated its concept of governance which has regularly been 
used as the basis for legitimizing the Bank’s expansion into new fields. Thirdly, I will 
discuss how the criminal justice sector has come to be included in the Bank’s activities 
in light of the Bank’s mandate under its Articles. The Bank has manoeuvred itself into 
the criminal justice sector by skillfully changing its concept of development without 
deviating from its mandate. The change can be described as an ‘evolution’ which has 
allowed the Bank to identify any area as a target for its development assistance.  
 
 
2. The World Bank Expands Its Targets 
 
2.1 Articles of Agreement 
 The World Bank’s Articles of Agreement do not provide a definition of 
‘development’. In Article I, the Bank’s first purpose is stated as follows: (i) to assist in 
the reconstruction and development of territories of member countries by facilitating the 
investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies 
destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime 
needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources 
                                                 
1 UNODC, “UNODC and World Bank Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” 
(2005) 20 Eastern Horizons, Regional Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, pp.20-21. 
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in less developed countries. Further purposes are: (ii) to promote private foreign 
investment by guarantees and loans, (iii) to promote the long-range balanced growth of 
international trade, (iv) to arrange loans and guarantees, and (v) to conduct its 
operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business 
conditions in the territories of member countries. Article I ends with the following 
provision: “The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth 
above.” 
 The Article’s wording has not been changed since the World Bank’s inception in 
1944. In practice, however, the Bank’s activities, though aimed at assisting in the 
development of member countries by providing capital for productive purposes, have 
changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s as the 
targets of its activities have greatly expanded. Since no definition is assigned to 
‘development’ in its Articles, the Bank has been able to transform its activities flexibly 
to attain ‘development.’ There is a constraint on it expansion, however, which is set 
forth in Section 10 of Article IV and reads as follows: “The Bank and its officers shall 
not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their 
decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations 
shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.” This 
provision prohibits the Bank from interfering in the political affairs of recipient 
countries and limits the Bank to considering only economic factors in its decisions to 
provide loans. As the Bank’s concept of development has evolved, enabling it to expand 
the range of its activities, this evolution has always been accompanied by the question 
how the provision prohibiting political activity should be interpreted in practice. In 
other words, it has now become a constant effort on the part of the Bank to explain 
‘development’ devoid of its political aspects when in reality the latter cannot be 
excluded from the former. 
 
2.2 The Start of the ‘Governance Doctrine’ 
 During the 1980s in its Structural Adjustment Policy, the Bank insisted that 
economic structural reform was essential for promoting the mid- and long-term 
economic growth of recipient countries. The market economy, privatization and external 
liberalization became the foundation of its Structural Adjustment Policy upon which the 
Bank promoted stabilization of the macro economy, reduction of the public sector and 
deregulation. However, these reforms did not necessarily bring success, or worse still, 
they brought social problems such as a serious disparity in receiving health care and 
education in several African countries. This invited a great deal of criticism against the 
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Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loan Program. Instead of examining its own failure, 
however, the Bank argued that the capacity of the government in the recipient country 
was the important factor in the Structural Adjustment Loan Program, and it attributed 
the failure of the program to the lack of such capacity of government on the recipient 
side. This was the beginning of the World Bank’s ‘governance doctrine.’ In one of its 
documents the World Bank states: “In the late 1980s Africa Region [Group] was the 
first operational unit in the Bank to identify governance issues as necessary for the 
success of its development agenda. AFR2 recognized that ‘underlying the litany of 
Africa’s development problem is a crisis of governance’.  …  Public sector 
management and civil service reforms were given greater emphasis. …  The AFR lead 
was followed by the Latin America and Caribbean [Groups], which supported civil 
service and judicial reform and provide assistance for decentralization. Since then, all 
regions [regional groups] have been addressing governance issues.”3 By bringing up 
the governance doctrine, the Bank stressed that there was no mistake in its prescription 
such as reduction of financial deficits and trade liberalization, and attributed the failure 
of its Structural Adjustment Loan Program to the lack of institutional capacity in the 
recipient country. Prohibited from interfering in the political affairs of a recipient 
country by its own Articles, how could the Bank claim a right to comment on a recipient 
country’s capacity of government, which is the embodiment of a country’s politics?4 
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, then the Bank’s General Counsel, argued that ‘governance’ has 
two distinct sets of aspects: (a) those which are related to the Bank’s purposes as stated 
in its Articles and (b) such other sets which represent prohibited political 
considerations.5 According to Shihata, ‘governance’ becomes an issue of concern to the 
Bank only in its strict sense of the good order required for a positive investment climate 
and for the efficient use of resources.6 He argued as follows:  
 Activities such as civil service reform and legal reform have been found to be 
relevant to the maintenance of “good order” in the management of a country’s 
resources through the introduction and implementation of appropriate rules and 
                                                 
2 AFR is an acronym for ‘Africa Regional Group’, a section in the World Bank which is in 
charge of lending to countries in the African region. 
3 World Bank, (2004) “Mainstreaming Anti-Corruption Activities in World Bank Assistance: A 
Review of Progress Since 1997”, Washington DC: The World Bank, p. 6.  
4 Shihata cited the definition of “governance” as follows: in its full sense, “governance” covers 
the manner in which a community is managed and directed, including the making and 
administration of policy in matters of political control as well as in such economic issues as may 
be relevant to the management of the community’s resources. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, (1991) “The 
World Bank in a Changing World”, Vol. 1, Dordrecht; Boston: M. Nijhoff Publishers, p. 79. 
5 ibid. p. 80. 
6 ibid. p. 93. 
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institutions, and were therefore distinguished from the typical exercise of political power 
to manage the country’s affairs which generally falls beyond the Bank’s mandate. As 
General Counsel to the Bank, I had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the 
Bank may favorably respond to a country’s request for assistance in the field of legal 
reform, including judicial reform, if it finds it relevant to the country’s economic 
development and to the success of the Bank’s lending strategy for the country.7  
 
 Under this rubric of ‘governance’, which distinguishes one that is relevant to the 
Bank’s work from one that is the exercise of political power, any kind of institution or 
organization related to state management if found relevant to economic development, 
can become a target for Bank assistance. Initially put forward as the reason for the 
failure of its Structural Adjustment Loan Program to African countries, the concept of 
‘governance’ has now come to be used regularly, and seemingly at the World Bank’s 
convenience, to explain the expansion of the Bank’s activities. 
 
2.3. Anti-Corruption for Good Governance 
 Given the fact that corruption in government, that is, abuse of public power, is 
related to political aspects of the country, the World Bank’s commitment to deal with 
such an issue would seem to go against its Articles of Agreement, which prohibit the 
Bank’s interference in the political affairs of recipient countries. To avoid such 
interference, the Bank began using the rationale that eradicating corruption was an 
essential component of ‘good governance.’ Such reasoning allowed the Bank to target 
corruption and make anti-corruption another of its activities. This section will examine 
the World Bank’s explanation which it has used to make anti-corruption relevant to its 
mandate. 
 The World Bank staff and management had long been aware of the importance of 
fighting corruption but felt unsure about how to deal with this problem within the 
Bank's mandate.8 Shihata described the start of the Bank’s anti-corruption activity in 
the early 1990s: 
 “The Articles of Agreement do not specifically include curbing corruption among 
the Bank’s purposes or functions. They generally prohibit the Bank from taking 
non-economic considerations into account in its decisions and from interfering in the 
political affairs of its members. For this reason, … [the Bank] has avoided, until 
                                                 
7 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, (1995) “Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of the 
World Bank,” in Malcom Rowat, et al., eds., Judicial Reform in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Proceedings of a World Bank Conference, World Bank Technical Paper No. 280, 
Washington DC: The World Bank.  
8 World Bank, (2004), p1. 
 6
recently, any full-fledged attempt to adopt an anti-corruption strategy. Since the early 
1990s, the Bank has, however, identified corruption as an issue to be taken into account 
in its work on governance and, in a few cases, begun to raise it in the country dialogue. 
It has also sought to assist its borrowing countries in introducing economic, 
administrative, legal and judicial reforms through a series of structural and sectoral 
adjustment loans, technical assistance loans and grants and sectoral investment loans. 
While the bank was not in this way directly involved in fighting corruption, it was aware 
that these reforms have a direct positive effect not only on the growth prospects of the 
borrowing countries but also on the level of corruption.”9 
 Though he admitted that the Bank’s commitment to anti-corruption was not 
explicitly included in the governance issue which the Bank began to deal with in the 
early 1990s, Shihata stated that it was already recognized that institutional reform for 
good governance had a positive impact on eradicating corruption. It can be seen that he 
explained the Bank’s involvement in anti-corruption by the same logic as he had used to 
legitimize its involvement in governance in recipient countries. 
 In 1995 James Wolfensohn became the first president of the World Bank, to 
express the Bank’s concern over corruption as a general development issue. He 
highlighted the corruption issue in his first speech before the annual meeting of the 
Board of Governors. He then asked Shihata, the Bank’s General Counsel, to consider 
how the Bank would be able to initiate action against corruption in accordance with its 
mandate. Shihata found the legal base for the Bank’s commitment to anti-corruption in 
recipient countries within his own argument about governance. He answered: 
 “As a practical matter, the World Bank can hardly insulate itself from major 
issues of international development policy. Corruption has become such an issue. Its 
prevalence in a given country increasingly influences the flow of public and private 
funds for investment in that country. The Bank’s lending programs and in particular its 
adjustment lending take into factors which determine the size and pace of such flows. 
From a legal viewpoint, what matters is that the Bank’s involvement must always be 
consistent with its Articles of Agreement. The Bank can in my view take many actions to 
help the fight against corruption.  …  The only legal barrier in this respect is that in 
doing so the Bank and its staff must be concerned only with the economic causes and 
effects and should refrain from intervening in the country’s political affairs. While the 
task may be difficult in borderline cases, its limits have been prescribed in detail in 
legal opinions issued by this author and endorsed by the Bank’s Board.”10 
                                                 
9 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, (1997) “Corruption – A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role 
of the World Bank”, 15 (3) Dickinson Journal of International Law, pp 451-485. 
10 ibid. p. 476. 
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 Citing his own legal opinion on governance issued in 1990,11 he stressed the 
relevance of the concept of governance in the recipient country to the Bank’s activity of 
providing assistance for economic reforms in that country. And he argued again that the 
concern of governance was not with the exercise of state power in the broad sense but 
specifically with the appropriate management of the public sector and the creation of an 
enabling environment for the private sector.12 It can be seen that the Bank’s direct 
involvement in the anti-corruption issue was justified by the General Counsel’s legal 
opinion which had once justified the Bank’s commitment to the recipient country’s 
governance in light of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. Regarded as an essential factor 
of good governance, anti-corruption became a target for the Bank’s assistance. 
According to Shihata, the logic of governance applies to anti-corruption mutatis 
mutandis.   
 At the same time, the Bank’s involvement in addressing corruption issues beyond 
the projects it financed had not been free from controversy. There was an argument that 
the Bank should only be concerned with functions explicitly stipulated in its Articles of 
Agreement, the main one being to help finance specific projects for productive purposes. 
Against this Shihata argued that the Bank had already been able to deal with a large 
number of governance and institutional issues which were directly relevant to its 
development mandate, without becoming entangled in partisan domestic politics 
(author’s emphasis).13 Shihata regarded corruption as an economically negative factor 
which adversely affected the flow of capital. Thus, involvement in anti-corruption was 
not interference in domestic politics, but an essential factor for economic development 
in the recipient country. In 1996 the Bank began treating corruption issues as within its 
mandate, regarding the General Counsel’s legal opinion on governance issued in 1990 
as having paved the way. In 1997 the World Bank executive board approved the Bank’s 
anti-corruption strategy thereby formally recognized corruption as a major development 
issue. Thereafter the Bank began to implement the strategy by providing vigorous 
support for anti-corruption efforts in numerous recipient countries. The World Bank 
emphasized strongly that its involvement in anti-corruption was not something new that 
began in 1997; rather it pointed to its long involvement by saying that: 
“… [The] Bank tried to attack corruption through its longstanding support to 
governance reform. Also, the reforms that the bank supported in the 1980s and 1990, 
including trade and financial liberalization, fiscal and regulatory reforms, and 
                                                 
11 Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing Members – The Extent of Their Relevance Under the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement, Legal Memorandum of the General Counsel, dated December 21, 
1990, also published as Chapter Two in Shihata, (1991). 
12 Shihata, (1997), p. 477. 
13 ibid. p. 476. 
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institutional strengthening were partly aimed at reducing the incentives for 
corruption.”14 
 
 It further stated that the launching of the 1997 strategy marked an important 
change putting the anti-corruption issue at the forefront of the Bank’s development 
agenda.15 
 
2.4. Anti-Money Laundering 
 The connection of governance with anti-corruption found a further natural link 
with anti-money laundering (AML). Once anti-corruption came to be seen as within the 
Bank’s mandate because it was essential to good governance, AML likewise began to be 
included in the mandate because it was regarded as a part of anti-corruption. The Bank’s 
commitment to AML started at the beginning of this century.  
 Regarding AML as an aspect of anti-corruption, the World Bank explained that its 
commitment to AML started in April 2001 when the executive directors of the IMF and 
the World Bank endorsed the view that money laundering was a matter of global 
concern.16 The directors noted that dealing with money laundering would require a 
cooperative approach involving many different institutions encompassing financial 
sector supervision and regulation, good governance, judicial and legal reform, and 
effective law enforcement.17 At the same time, the executive board of the World Bank 
noted that although the Bank could support efforts against money laundering, it had to 
remain within its mandate and thus avoid connection with law enforcement activities.18 
This latter point is noteworthy as it shows again that the World Bank was very much 
concerned about keeping itself within its mandate and was unsure about the relationship 
of AML to its mandate. This suggests that a commitment to AML might include activity 
which goes beyond the Bank’s mandate. The executive board instructed the Bank’s staff 
to work out methods for assessing the implementation of anti-money laundering 
requirements for banks, insurance companies and other capital markets. This agenda 
was expanded to include technical assistance related to anti-terrorism financing,19 
clearly showing that since September 11, 2001, the Bank has expanded its activities 
under the name of anti-money laundering to cover anti-terrorism measures. The 
dramatic increase in the number of such programs is evident from the rapid increase in 
                                                 
14 Word Bank, (2004), p. 5. 
15 ibid. 
16 World Bank, (2004), p 25. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 World Bank, (2004), p. 26. 
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the number of documents related thereto. Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism have come to be treated as twins and are now abbreviated as 
AML/CFT. 
 
2.5. Significance of the “Governance Doctrine” 
 It is unclear whether such an expansion of Shihata’s “governance doctrine” was 
intended at the time of its pronouncement in early 1990; however, his legal opinion on 
governance has been cited as the logical and legal basis enabling the Bank to expand its 
range of targets. By distinguishing it from the typical exercise of political power, the 
promotion of good governance has become a convenient way to justify the Bank’s 
commitment to new fields. The Bank clearly states that the rationale behind its 
involvement in corruption is the General Counsel’s legal opinion on governance issued 
in 1990.20 Coupled with CFT, AML is regarded as an aspect of anti-corruption, which 
constitutes a part of the governance issue. The legitimacy of the Bank’s commitment to 
AML and anti-corruption can be deduced from the governance doctrine. And vice versa, 
it can be postulated that inferring from the governance theory, the Bank can interpret 
any issue as a target for its activities.  
 Nonetheless, the Bank still needs to show that its activities fall within its mandate. 
By deliberately deploying the concept of governance, it has been able to expand the 
targets of its activities, but it is still required to explain that this expansion does not 
conflict with its Articles. In the next section, I will discuss how the Bank has explained 
its involvement in the criminal justice sector in light of its Articles of Agreement. 
 
3. World Bank Creeps into the Criminal Justice Sector 
 Based on its “governance doctrine”, the World Bank has expanded the target of its 
activities to anti-corruption and to AML. As mentioned above, the World Bank became 
involved in the criminal justice sector through its AML/CFT project set up jointly with 
the UNODC in 2005. A typical example of the Bank’s AML project is providing 
technical assistance to the central bank or financial authority of the recipient country in 
order to build an information management system regarding customers and money 
flows. However, as part of its partnership with the UNODC, the Bank funded a project 
that included technical assistance for criminal prosecution. Such funding might be the 
kind that the Bank’s executive board cautioned against providing.21 The Bank had 
written up no legal opinion on the criminal justice sector prior to this project. Using 
legal documents of the World Bank, the next sub-sections will examine the development 
                                                 
20 World Bank, (2004), p 2. 
21 World Bank, (2004), p.25. 
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of the Bank’s commitment to the criminal justice sector 
 
3.1. Manifestations of the World Bank’s Expansion into the Criminal Justice 
Sector 
 The first manifestation of the World Bank’s desire to launch its involvement in the 
criminal justice sector can be found in a booklet issued in 2003 by the Bank’s Legal 
Vice Presidency. In order to provide a premise of for advancing into this sector, the 
booklet states: 
“… [L]egal and judicial reform activities are of a highly sensitive nature which presents 
challenges. Making sure that these activities stay within the mandate of the institution 
and within authorization of the Board is essential, while at the same time, permitting the 
Law and Justice Group to pilot new areas under the supervision of the General Counsel. 
First, although the Bank’s mandate directs it to take only economic considerations into 
account, and while the Bank does not involve itself into the politics of any member 
country, it must often be cognizant of the political situation in its client countries. The 
structural/institutional character of law reform, and the significant impact of reform on 
entrenched political and social interests in society, mean that political considerations 
are often an important part of law reform efforts, and those involved in Bank projects 
must take account of these factors while concurrently remaining faithful to the strictures 
of the Bank Charter [Articles of Agreement].” 22 
 This comment shows that in its assistance for legal and judicial reforms, the Bank 
is very much concerned about maintaining its justification and explaining its 
non-deviation from its mandate as defined in its Articles. The comment also suggests 
the sensitivity of legal and judicial reforms which have political and social impacts on 
the society; and as economic consideration is not enough, political consideration is 
inevitably required for successful legal reforms. 
 The comment then took up the criminal justice sector as a field which the Bank 
should branch out into in the near future. 
“Another area that poses challenges is the field of criminal law. In fighting corruption, 
both the opportunities and incentives for corrupt activities must be considered. 
Focusing on preventive measures in isolation, without assisting a country’s efforts to 
criminalize corruption and step up capacity in criminal law enforcement, has left a gap 
in the Bank’s anticorruption assistance strategy and potentially undermines the 
effectiveness of the Bank’s activities in this area. …    The Law and Justice Group has 
had very limited involvement in the area of criminal justice, leaving this area to other 
                                                 
22  World Bank, (2003) “Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions“, Legal Vice 
Presidency, Washington DC: The World Bank, p. 70. 
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donors. This reluctance is rooted in the concern that criminal justice may fall outside 
the scope of the Bank’s mandate. Issues related to governance, legal and judicial reform, 
and corruption were at one time thought to be outside the Bank’s mandate, but are now 
accepted to be within it. An effective and accountable criminal justice system is also a 
requisite for promoting good governance, a necessary component of legal and judicial 
systems, and essential for any strategy to curb corruption. The Bank’s policy on 
criminal justice will be developed in the near future. Of course, there are limits on 
where the Bank should be involved. The Bank’s Articles of Agreement prohibit it from 
interfering in the political affairs of its member states. Its comparative advantage may 
assist in defining this limitation; …” 23 
  
 The rationale supporting the Bank’s involvement in the criminal justice sector 
again lies in Shihata’s “governance doctrine.” The Bank recognizes that there are 
inherently political aspects in legal and judicial reforms. Thus, in order to assist legal 
and judicial reforms in a recipient country, Shihata was careful to define ‘governance’ as 
different from the typical exercise of political power in the management of a country’s 
affairs which generally fell beyond the Bank’s mandate. The reasoning justifying the 
commitment to the criminal justice sector runs as follows: 1) it is already accepted that 
issues related to governance, legal and judicial reforms and corruption lie within the 
Bank’s mandate; 2) an effective and accountable criminal justice sector is necessary for 
good governance, legal and judicial reforms and anti-corruption; therefore, 3) the 
criminal justice sector is within the Bank’s mandate. In effect, this reasoning indicates 
that any field, if it is regarded as essential for good governance, can become a target of 
the Bank’s activity. In 2003 the Bank’s new challenge to the criminal justice sector was 
manifested, although the General Counsel’s legal opinion on the issue had not yet been 
written. 
  
3.2. Human Security 
 The advent of the concept of “Human Security” is another factor supporting the 
World Bank’s involvement in the criminal justice sector. The Report of the Commission 
on Human Security, issued in May 2003, emphasizes the importance of advancing the 
security of people in the various stages of their lives. In Chapter 4 of the report, public 
safety, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, reconciliation and 
coexistence, and governance and empowerment, are listed as key human security 
clusters following violent conflict. In order to attain, inter alia, public safety, the report 
                                                 
23 World Bank, (2003), p71. 
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points out the need for the reform or creation of the state security sector. It states that 
along with reforming the army, police and intelligence services, reforming the security 
sector also requires changing the legal system, building an independent judiciary and 
providing services to manage prisons. The report further implies that there is a need to 
get the income and expenditures of the military, police and other security institutions 
under control. It goes on to say that: 
“Effective state security institutions upholding the rule of law and human rights are an 
essential component for achieving human security, development and governance. They 
are keys to rebuilding trust and confidence in institutions and creating a climate for 
reducing poverty and attracting investments.” 24 
Further on is the following noteworthy statement: 
“Despite the growing attention to the reform of the state security sector, multilateral 
actors, such as the World Bank, have been reluctant to engage. They see such efforts as 
interfering in the internal and political affairs of a country. Far from it, however; 
reform of the security sector should be seen as an integral part of any strategy to 
strengthen governance and development.”25 
 
 Thus the report argues that an area the World Bank has avoided in light of its 
Articles of Agreement is actually one essential to development and requiring the Bank’s 
active involvement. This argument suggests that, by categorizing crime prevention and 
public safety as infrastructure for development, the comprehensive idea of Human 
Security has encouraged the World Bank to deliberately expand its concept of 
development. 
 
3.3. General Counsel’s Legal Opinion on the Criminal Justice Sector 
 It was not till January 2006 that the General Counsel of the World Bank issued a 
legal opinion on the Bank’s involvement in the criminal justice sector of recipient 
countries.26 In his Legal Opinion, the General Counsel said that although the Bank had 
recently become more involved in the criminal justice sector, there had not yet been a 
corresponding evolution in the Bank’s legal views on the link between criminal justice 
and the Bank’s work within the context of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. He 
                                                 
24 Commission on Human Security, (2003), Human Security Now, New York: UN Publications, 
p. 63. 
25 ibid. 
26 Legal Opinion on Bank Activities in the Criminal Justice Sector, Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel, dated January 31, 2006. 
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admitted that the Word Bank’s involvement in the criminal justice sector had preceded 
the issuance of a legal opinion thereon.  
 The aim of the Legal Opinion is, of course, to provide justification for the Bank’s 
involvement in the criminal justice sector of a recipient country. The reasoning is the 
same as that already used. First, the Legal Opinion defines the concept of development 
comprehensively enough to include the criminal justice sector. Then, the Opinion states 
that there exists an economic rationale for the Bank’s involvement in the sector. Thus, 
the Opinion concludes that this involvement in the sector is for economic development 
purposes and is not interference in the political affairs of the recipient country; therefore, 
the Bank’s involvement in the sector is within its mandate. This is expatiated as follows. 
 The Legal Opinion begins by stating that the interpretation of the purposes 
enumerated in the Articles of Agreement has evolved to meet the needs of a broader 
concept of development and that the concept of development itself has evolved 
substantially over the past years along with the Bank’s mission. Development is no 
longer confined to economic development as narrowly defined, but encompasses broad 
areas of human development, social development, governance and institutions. The 
Legal Opinion states that contemporary practitioners and others in the development 
community treat the criminal justice sector as a means for the delivery of services to the 
public in the areas of safety, and as a central part of the everyday meaning of the rule of 
law, human rights and good governance. The Legal Opinion defines the criminal justice 
sector not only as the traditional institutions such as the police, prosecutor, public 
defenders, courts and prisons, but also as a wide range of other institutions such as 
private police forces, victim services, private lawyers and bar associations, human rights 
and ombudsman’s offices, addiction treatment programs and community service 
programs.  
 The Legal Opinion then explains the economic rationale behind the commitment 
to the criminal justice sector. The potential development impact of intervention in 
criminal justice is supported by ongoing research which shows that crime and violence 
have become serious obstacles to sustainable economic development; they undermine 
strategies to increase levels of social and human capital, and have direct and indirect 
costs that divert funds away from development and other productive activities. 
AML/CFT is referred to as an example of intervention with an economic rationale given 
the economic damage that results from money laundering and terrorist financing which 
divert financial and other resources away from pro-development activities. 
 Referring to the prohibition on political interference,27 the Legal Opinion states 
                                                 
27 The Legal Opinion mentions a counter-view that criminal justice is essentially and exercise 
of sovereign power, akin to the military, support for which will inevitably involve the Bank in 
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that no Bank intervention, even in such traditional areas as infrastructure, is immune 
from political implications that may draw the Bank unwittingly into partisan debate. It 
further states that the risk of political interference should be managed rather than 
avoided altogether. In the area of criminal justice, study of the political situation of 
recipient countries will be needed in order to avoid involvement in political affairs. The 
Legal Opinion divides the criminal justice sector into three areas: white, black and grey. 
White areas are those where the Bank’s activity would likely pose no serious legal 
issues; black areas are those which, because the economic rationale is weak or the 
inherent risk of political interference is high, or both, pose serious legal issues; grey 
areas are those that merit particularly close attention. It is stated that the financing of 
policing, prosecutors and prisons falls into this third area where the high potential risks 
need to be managed by well-formulated guidelines and specialized expertise, neither of 
which, the Legal Opinion admits, the Bank presently possesses.  
The Legal Opinion concludes that the Articles of Agreement do not prohibit the Bank 
from involvement in the criminal justice sector, and that any particular intervention 
should be grounded in a reasonable economic rationale and should avoid interference or 
the appearance of interference in the political affairs of recipient countries. 
 This Legal Opinion gives justification to the Bank’s involvement in the criminal 
justice sector in light of its Articles and clarifies that the conditions for involvement be a 
rational economic basis and non-interference in political affairs. Under these two 
conditions, the Bank’s activities in a country’s criminal justice sector are to be guided 
by ‘white’, ‘black’ and ‘grey’ areas. This Legal Opinion is the first legal document to 
address the legitimacy of the World Bank’s involvement in the criminal justice sector 
under its Articles of Agreement. It clearly supports the expansion of the Bank’s targets 
of activity. It also clarifies the areas where the Bank should and should not become 
involved; and when undertaking any particular activity, it stresses the need to fulfill the 
two aforesaid conditions. However, this Legal Opinion comes three years after the 
manifestation of the Bank’s involvement in the criminal justice sector; thus it is likely 
that under careful scrutiny there might be grey areas where the Bank has already 
become involved. 
 
3.4. Controversy over the Bank’s Involvement in the Criminal Justice Sector 
 The expansion of the Bank’s activities is not without controversy.28 On one side 
                                                                                                                                               
making political judgments and therefore not a proper subject for Bank intervention. 
28 See Guy Brucculeri, (2004) “A Need to Refocus the Mandate of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank,” 17 Winsor Review of Legal and Social Issues, pp. 53-82; Jessica 
Einborn, (2001) “The World Bank’s Mission Creep,” 80 (5) Foreign Affairs, pp. 22-35; Jane 
Rueger, (2003) “From Reluctant Champion to Developing Ringmaster: Managing the 
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are those who argue that the Bank should concentrate in its original mandate, i.e. 
assisting in economic activities; on the other side are those who say the Bank should be 
involved in poverty reduction and active in as many areas as possible for combating 
terrorism which is regarded to be resulted from poverty.  
 There is also a concern that enhancing AML regulations might infringe on human 
rights in developing countries where the laws do not necessarily guarantee the rights of 
citizens and people held as suspects. Strengthening AML regulations will definitely 
affect the role and function of the criminal justice sector in the society concerned. 
Unless the legislation process is open to the public and public comments are invited and 
taken into consideration, tightened AML regulations may result in biased empowerment 
of the prosecutor’s office. Furthermore, when coupled with CFT, the targets of AML 
programs tend to expand. It should be scrutinized that the Bank makes legislation and 
enforcement of such laws a condition for receiving its loans.  
 By assisting legal and judicial reforms in the recipient country, the donor, 
consciously or not, reinforces the power of the state. Assistance to the criminal justice 
sector in particular might adversely affect the human rights situation in the country. The 
Commission on Human Security stresses the significance of security in a country for the 
achievement of development, and expects the commitment of the World Bank to the 
reform of police and prosecutors offices in recipient countries in the name of 
development. However, external assistance to the reform of legal and judicial systems 
may lead to the reinforcement of state power, to put it further, the existing undemocratic 
regime of a recipient country. Under the guise of combating terrorism, transnational 
organized crime and money laundering, assistance to a country might reinforce an 
undesirable administration with a poor human rights record. The idea that the rule of 
law upheld by effective state security institutions is important for development, has to 
be applied carefully, otherwise it could be misused.29  
                                                                                                                                               
Expanding Mission of the World Bank,” 10 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Studies, pp. 201-226; 
Olivera Medenica, (2004) “The World Bank, the IMF and the Global Prevention of Terrorism: A 
Role for Conditionalities,” 29 (2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, pp. 663-707. 
29 Also I would like to point out that the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral 
donors promote the ‘rule of law’ as an essential component of good governance, but 
they have never thought that their assistance need to be provided under the ‘rule of law’. 
They deliberately employ the concept of the ‘rule of law’ to be confined to the domestic 
sphere of the recipient country. It is interesting to note that Japan’s Ministry of Justice, 
in the explanation of its legal technical assistance, states that the legal system of a 
country is a ‘common property’ (‘kyotsu zaisan’ in Japanese) with other countries. (See 
Japan’s Ministry of Justice’s website: Hoseibishien ni tsuite (About Legal technical 
Assistance), http://www.moj.go.jp/.) If so, what are the rights and obligations of the 
donor to such property, i.e., the legal system of the recipient country? This is a sensitive 
question of tension between the donor and the recipient country over the concept of 
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 While acknowledging that development in a country is not confined to a 
particular area but related to the society as a whole, and accepting that the criminal 
justice sector falls within the parameters of “development”, it is still necessary to 
continue examining whether and how the Bank should be involved in this sector. 
 In the Legal Opinion discussed above, the financing of policing, prosecutors and 
prisons is regarded as falling within the “grey area” where the potential risks of 
interfering in political affairs are high and effectively managing those risks requires 
well-formulated guidelines and specialized expertise. The General Counsel admitted 
that the World Bank possesses neither of these at present, and it seems that the Bank 
entered into its partnership with the UNODC in order to acquire such expertise. This 
project seems to have involved an implementation process which the Bank’s executive 
board had once cautioned against engaging in.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The World Bank has manoeuvered itself into the criminal justice sector by 
skillfully changing its concept of development. The Bank advocates the need for good 
governance in order to achieve development and has targeted numerous institutions in 
recipient countries in order to promote good governance. When becoming involved in a 
new field, the Bank always justifies its move with an economic, non-political rationale. 
The Bank justified its involvement in the criminal justice sector by arguing that such 
involvement was to ensure security and the rule of law in order to promote good 
governance. The concept of human security became a motivating factor for this 
involvement. The flexible interpretation of its Articles of Agreement to explain the 
legitimacy of its expanding activities has enabled the World Bank to become involved in 
areas and activities which cannot be directly construed from its Articles. Moreover, this 
process has been pursued actively as the Bank’s policy to meet the exigencies of its 
practices.30  
                                                                                                                                               
‘rule of law’. 
30 Shihata states that it is not enough for the General Counsel’s advice to be legally correct; it is 
also expected to enable the executive directors to perform their responsibilities in a manner 
which best suits the needs of the Bank’s business. Shihata also wrote, “Without changing its 
charter which defines its purposes and sets out explicit limits on its work, the World Bank has 
greatly broadened the scope of its operations beyond anything envisaged at the time of its 
establishment. …  Expanding dimensions of the concept of development have had their effect 
on the Bank’s functions.” Ibrahim I.F. Shihata, (2000) “The Dynamic Evolution of International 
Organizations: The Case of the World Bank”, 2 Journal of History of International Law, pp. 
217-249. 
 17
 As the concept of good governance taken hold in the development community, a 
frame of mind has arisen that equates development with the attainment of good 
governance. It is pointed out that since the revival of law and development in early 1990, 
the idea that building ‘the rule of law’ might itself be a development strategy has 
encouraged the hope that choosing law can substitute for the perplexing political and 
economic choices that have been at the centre of development policy-making for half a 
century.31 However, development policy is formulated through competing political 
choices and economic analyses, and the rule of law cannot substitute for these. 
Therefore, we legal scholars who discuss law and development need to continue asking 
ourselves what is development, although we are unable to ‘evolve’ the concept of 
development as the World Bank does at its need and convenience. 
  
                                                 
31 David Kennedy, (2003) “Laws and Developments”, in John Hatchard and Amanda 
Perry-Kessaris (eds.), Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century: Essays in 
honour of Peter Slinn, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, p. 17. 
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